The problem of evil can be expressed in different ways and involves the conundrum of how to reconcile the existence of God and evil. The following paper will provide an overview of how Christians have responded to the problem of evil.[1]

But before I begin, I want to sympathize with those who are hurting, and I endeavour that my comments will be sensitive to the gravity of the issue. However, this paper is an academic attempt to discuss the matter, and I acknowledge that there are other dimensions and that a counselor should also be considered.

Defining Evil

Broadly speaking, evil refers to “any bad state of affairs, wrongful action, or character flaw.”[2] Some Christians have understood evil to be a privation that is not a positive substance but rather a lack or absence of good.[3] Evil is often divided into moral evil, which is evil resulting from the activity of free or moral agents (i.e., murder), and natural evil, which is evil not resulting from the activity of free agents (i.e., a storm).

Plantinga argues that it is possible that natural evils are the product of demon activity, i.e., Job 1–2.[4] Dembski sees natural evil, even animal suffering in the world before the arrival of humans, as retroactively due to human sins.[5] DeWeese has suggested a free process defense that proposes the natural laws in the world as dynamic and not directly caused by God moment by moment.[6] Smith thinks natural evil is a consequence of Adam’s fall into sin.[7]

Most Christians believe that morality is objective[8] and, consequently, evil is objectively bad; it is not merely a personal preference that one does not like; instead, it is a horrific reality. Sadly, there are numerous examples of evil, including sickness, disease, death, war, and tragedies such as the Holocaust.[9] In light of the recent events in the Middle East, some evils really seem beyond words.

Objectivism is the view that “moral statements are stating facts about the acts of morality themselves or the objects that are said to have value.”[10] Objectivism is a type of cognitivism that holds “moral statements make truth claims because they are indicative statements that convey descriptive factual information: the statement “x is right” can be either true or false.”[11] That is to say, most Christians are not relativists nor subjectivists concerning morality.

The Problems of Evil

There is, in fact, not one problem of evil,[12] but there are multiple problems of evil, including the logical problem that argues that God and evil are mutually exclusive. The probabilistic problem argues that given the kinds and amount of evil in the world, it is unlikely that God exists. The emotional problem of evil is not an academic challenge to God’s existence, but rather, it is a personal issue of how one could trust God, who allows evil.[13]

The Logical Problem

One formulation of the logical problem is as follows:

1. An all-loving, all-powerful God exists.
2. If God is all-powerful, He can create any world that He wants.
3. If God is all-loving, He prefers a world without suffering.
4. Suffering exists.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.[14]

In responding to the intellect challenge from evil, one is not required to offer a theodicy[15] that is God’s actual reason for permitting evil but rather a defense that is a possible but not necessarily the actual reason God might have for allowing evil—a defense is sufficient to demonstrate that the logical problem of evil is not successful.

Premise One: God is all-loving and all-powerful

As for premise one, orthodox Christians affirm that God is maximally excellent, of which none greater could possibly exist. Consequently, being perfect,[16] God is omnibenevolent[17] and omnipotent,[18] among other things.[19]

One could defeat this argument by giving up one of these attributes of God as Kushner, When Bad Things Happen to Good People, does with God’s omnipotence, and so such a god would like to stop evil but isn’t always able to. Some open theists deny that future propositions have a truth value, so even an omniscient being cannot know the future. Consequently, on this conception of God, he does all he can to stop evil but cannot infallibly see all evil that will happen. But orthodox Christians affirm premise one that God is all-loving and all-powerful.

Premise Two: Can an All-powerful Being Create Any World He Wants

As for premise two, omnipotence does not necessarily mean that God can do absolutely anything or whatever is universally possible; rather, omnipotence entails that God lacks no power or is able to bring about any state of affairs, which is logically possible for anyone in that situation to bring about. Consequently, there is no inability in the failure to actualize things like square-circles or married-bachelors, for such things are incoherent and nonexistent. Similarly, if God created creatures with libertarian free will, while it is still logically possible (although not necessarily true) that free creatures always freely only make good choices,[20] it could be that for any set of creatures, at least one of those creatures would freely go astray, thereby introducing evil into that world. Therefore, premise two is not necessarily true; an all-powerful being cannot create just any world, but only what is feasible given the counterfactuals[21] of creaturely freedom (if God chooses to create such beings). Consequently, it is logically possible that suffering could exist in the world, not due to God’s immediate action but through an evil choice of free agents.

Libertarians are incompatibilists (i.e., they think free will is not compatible with determinism), and they think at least some actions or choices are freely performed. Incompatibilists hold that “free will and determinism are mutually exclusive and, consequently, that we act freely (i.e., with free will) only if determinism is false.”[22] Determinism is “the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions.”[23] Compatiblistic understandings of free will not suffice as a response to the logical problem of evil since, according to compatibilism, “free will is compatible with determinism,”[24] and so God could have determined that people always freely do good.

Some formulations of the free will defence argue that it is possible that all creatures suffer from transworld depravity and so go wrong. “An essence suffers from transworld depravity iff [if and only if] for every world W such that E entails the properties is significantly free in W and always does what is right in W, there is a time t and action A at t such that (1) A is morally significant for E’s instantiation in W at t, and (2) If God had (weakly) actualized the initial segment of W up to t, E’s instantiation would have gone wrong with respect to A.”[25]

Premise Three: Does an omnibenevolent being prefer a World without Suffering

As for premise three, omnibenevolence entails that God is necessarily and wholly good; he never does anything evil.[26] So, while it is true that God is all-loving, it does not necessarily follow that he might not have sufficient reasons for permitting suffering in the world. Such possible grounds include allowing evil for a greater good,[27] or that it enables character development,[28] or for free creatures, or because the purpose of life is not happiness but knowledge of God, which brings everlasting true joy.

Premise Four: Suffering Exists

As discussed above, Christians affirm this premise and believe that objective evil exists. They do not affirm moral subjectivism, nor do they think evil is an illusion. This is not to deny that there are grey issues that are complicated, but it is to state that there are ultimately true or false answers to ethical questions.

Conclusion to the Logical Problem of Evil

As demonstrated, there are reasons to think premises two and three are not necessarily true (as required by the logical problem of evil), so the logical problem is unsuccessful. Such explanations have led many to conclude, “It is now acknowledged on (almost) all sides that the logical argument is bankrupt.”[29]

The Probabilistic Problem

However, while God and evil might not be mutually exclusive, given all the evidence of evil in this world, one might argue that the existence of evil renders God’s existence improbable—this is known as the probabilistic problem of evil. The Christian could agree that when one only looks at the evil in this world, it gives one reason to doubt.[30] However, if we were to take into account the full scope of evidence, including things like the cosmological argument or fine-tuning of the universe or Jesus’ resurrection, then God’s existence is probable.[31] Others have added that since humans are finite, we are not in the best position to evaluate whether an omniscient being might have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil.[32] Finally, Craig argues, “The Christian faith entails doctrines that increase the probability of the co-existence of God and evil. [namely] a. The chief purpose of life is not happiness, but the knowledge of God. b. Mankind is in a state of rebellion against God and His purpose. c. The knowledge of God spills over into eternal life. d. The knowledge of God is an incommensurable good.”[33] Consequently, as a scholarly challenge, evil does not make God’s existence less likely.

The Emotional Problem

The personal problem of evil concerns why would one trust a God who permits such evil or why does God allow me to experience difficulties in life? Unless one has a word from the Lord, we cannot know; however, some principles from Scripture can help one trust God through the turmoil. Genesis, the first book of the Bible, reminds us that God created a good world, and it was because of human sin and rebellion that suffering occurred (cf. Gen 1–3). Yet, God demonstrates his love in that even while we were still far from him and his good ways, Christ died for depraved people like us to restore us (cf. Rom 5:8; Isa 53:5). Revelation, the last book of the Bible, promises that God will set things right. “‘He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death’ or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away” (Rev 21:4, NIV2011). Till then, God’s Spirit is at work, and Jesus knows the struggles we face (cf. Heb 2:18; 4:15; 5:7–9). Further, in his book, Where Is God When It Hurts? Yancey asks, “Where is the church”?[34] Meaning that the body of Christ is active to serve this hurting world right now. We are not left alone. The Bible also teaches that sometimes people suffer not because they did anything to deserve it—there is innocent suffering (cf. John 9:1–3; Job 1–2; Psa 59:3–4). Christianity affirms that there is an afterlife that could comfort those who have suffered and bring justice.[35]

Many more points could be made about how the Christian God comforts those who suffer (cf. 2 Cor 1:3–5), but this briefly illustrates that even the emotional problem of evil need not be overwhelming. In fact, evil should point us to the love of God found in Christ, who died for us and rose to conquer death and grant believers everlasting life.

Other Issues

A few related matters to the problem of evil include: the devil, animal suffering, original sin, and why fight against evil.

The Devil

Christianity teaches that the Devil or Satan is a real being and is evil and, alongside demons, causes and influences suffering in the world. The devil is ultimately finite but is nevertheless a powerful foe who will one day be finally defeated.[36]

Animal Suffering

Christians have approached the problem of animal suffering in different ways. Young Earth Creationists believe there was no vertebrate animal suffering until after the fall.[37] “Murray argues ‘that those creatures which do not have a nervous system do not suffer pain, whereas those which do have may not truly suffer phenomenological pain (similar to cases of blindsight).’”[38]

Original Sin

Christians believe that evil entered the world as a result of sin. With regard to the question of why people subsequent to Adam and Eve fall into sin, Christians generally reject the idea that all people are born guilty[39] and affirm a corruption-only view, which holds:

“1. All human beings except Christ possess Original Sin.

2. Original Sin is an inherited corruption of nature, a condition that every fallen human being possesses from the first moment of generation.

3. Fallen humans are not culpable for being generated with this morally vitiated condition.

4. Fallen humans are not culpable for a first, or primal, sin either. That is, they do not bear Original Guilt (i.e., the guilt of the sin of the first human beings).

5. A person born with this corruption of nature will normally inevitably commit actual sin.

6. Fallen human beings are culpable for their actual sins and condemned for them, in the absence of atonement.”[40]

Why Fight Suffering

It could be asked why one should fight to eradicate evil if evil is part of God’s providential plan. A brief response is that while Christians hold that God is sovereign, they also affirm that creatures have free will and we live in a fallen world that is not ultimately the way it should be. So, following the example of Jesus Christ, the God-man who strived against evil and promised to one day finally set things right, Christians in this regard should seek to do what Jesus would do and fight evil.

Conclusion

Evil is horrendous. This short paper does not take the matter lightly, but it does believe that the Christian worldview has a sound response to intellectual challenges and a hopeful response that can provide solace to a hurting world. This paper has outlined how Christians have responded to the problem of evil. For those who are hurting, I would encourage you to seek out a friend, a pastor, or a counsellor because they can offer support that a paper cannot, and I pray that at all times, you will know Christ’s peace and grace and find healing in Jesus. God bless.

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[1] The problem of evil is not merely a Christian problem; rather, all worldviews need to offer an explanation for evil. See: Corduan, “Evil in Non-Christian Religions,” 175–96; Trakakis, The Problem of Evil; Franks, Explaining Evil.

[2] Calder, “The Concept of Evil.”

[3] Cf. Grant, “The Privation Account of Moral Evil,” 271–286; Loke, Evil, Sin, and Christian Theism, 16.

[4] Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 58–9.

[5] Dembski, The End of Christianity, 124–55.

[6] DeWeese, “Natural Evil,” 53–64.

[7] Smith, “Cosmic and Universal Death from Adam’s Fall,” 75–85.

[8] Objectivism is the view that “moral statements are stating facts about the acts of morality themselves or the objects that are said to have value” (Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 419). Objectivism is a type of cognitivism that holds “moral statements make truth claims because they are indicative statements that convey descriptive factual information: the statement “x is right” can be either true or false” (Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 419). That is to say, most Christians are not relativists nor subjectivists concerning morality.

[9] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Introduction to the Holocaust.”

[10] Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 419.

[11] Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 419.

[12] For a history of the problem of evil, see Hickson, “A Brief History of Problems of Evil,” 3–18.

[13] One could also add things like the problem of divine hiddenness, and while this is an important matter, it is beyond the scope of this paper. See Rea, The Hiddenness of God.

[14] Cf. Craig, On Guard, 155–6.

[15] Cf. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 28; Walls, “Why Plantinga Must Move from Defense to Theodicy,” 375–8; Tierno, “On Defense as Opposed to Theodicy,” 167–74.

[16] Cf. Deut 32:4; Psa 145:3; Jer 10:6; Matt 5:48; Rogers, Perfect Being Theology; Leftow, “Why perfect being theology?,” 103–18; Wierenga, “Augustinian Perfect Being Theology and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” 139–51; Nagasawa, Maximal God.

[17] Cf. Psa 136; John 3:16; Rom 8:35–39; Eph 3:18–19; 1 John 4:8; Carson, The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God.

[18] Cf. Jer 32:17; Matt 19:26; Eph 3:20; Rev 1:8; Flint and Freddoso, “Maximal Power,” 115–41.

[19] Cf. Erickson, Christian Theology, 289–308; Frame, Systematic Theology, 231–281, 304–420; Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, 518–955; Grudem, Systematic Theology, 185–268.

[20] Cf. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 200–12; Bernstein and Helms, “A Simpler Free Will Defence,” 197–203; Choo and Goh, “The Free Will Defense Revisited,” 32–45.

[21] Cf. Pruss, and Rasmussen, “Explaining Counterfactuals of Freedom,” 193–98; Laing, Middle Knowledge, 50–3; Muñoz Bueno, “Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom.”

[22] Clarke, Capes, and Swenson, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.”

[23] Hoefer, “Causal Determinism.”

[24] McKenna and Coates, “Compatibilism.”

[25] Loke, Evil, Sin, and Christian Theism, 19, italics original. Cf. Plantinga, “Transworld Depravity, Transworld Sanctity, & Uncooperative Essences,” 178–91; Otte, “Transworld Depravity and Unobtainable Worlds,” 165–77. Against the free will defense, see Ekstrom, God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will.

[26] Cf. Psalm 25:8; 34:8; 92:15; 106:1; 107:1; 136:1; 1 Chron 16:34; Nahum 1:7; Ezra 3:11; Mark 10:18; Luke 18:18–19; James 1:17.

[27] Cf. Plantinga, “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa,’” 1–25.

[28] Cf. Spiegel, “The Irenaean Soul-Making Theodicy,” 80–93; Moser, “Theodicy as Trajectory,” 79–98.

[29] Alston, “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,” 29. Similarly, Mackie states, “We can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another” (The Miracle of Theism, 154). Also, Rowe writes, “Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim” (“The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 335).

[30] Alternatively, along the lines of the moral argument, a theist might argue that God is the best explanation of objective moral facts, and evil is an example of an objective moral fact. Cf. Evans, “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God.”

[31] Cf. Ruloff and Horban, eds., Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology; McIntosh, “Recent Work on Traditional Arguments for Theism I,” 1–12; McIntosh, “Recent Work on Traditional Arguments for Theism II,” 1–9; Loke, Investigating the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.

[32] Cf. Loke, Evil, Sin, and Christian Theism, 22–30.

[33] Craig, “The Problem of Evil.”

[34] Yancey, Where Is God When It Hurts?, 247.

[35] Cf. Sprinkle, ed., Four Views on Hell; Wittmer, ed., Four Views on Heaven.

[36] Cf. Gen 3; possibly Isa 14; possibly Ezek 28; Matt 4:1, 10; Rev 12:9; 20:10; Grudem, Systematic Theology, 533–60.

[37] Cf. Lacey, “Animal Death Before the Fall?”

[38] Loke, Evil, Sin, and Christian Theism, 95; cf. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw. See also, Moritz, “Animal Suffering, Evolution, and the Origins of Evil,” 348–80; Sollereder, God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering.

[39] Cf. Deut 24:16; 2 Kings 14:6; Jer 31:29–30; Ezek 18:20; Rom 5:12–19; Loke, Evil, Sin, and Christian Theism, 159.

[40] Loke, Evil, Sin, and Christian Theism, 159–60; cf. McCall, Against God and Nature; Stump and Meister, eds., Original Sin and the Fall.

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By David Graieg, 11 Nov 2023